

## REVIEW

By Assoc. Prof. Dr. Kristiyan Enchev, “Ontology and Epistemology” section at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology – BAS

For Ch. Assist. Prof. Jassen Andreev, PhD, an applicant for the academic position “Associate Professor” for the needs of “Ontology and Epistemology” section, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at the BAS, Professional direction 2.3 Philosophy (Ontology), announced in the State Gazette, issue 67 of 04.08.2023.

Jassen Andreev has applied with 22 publications and exceeds the minimal national requirements for an Associate professor, as the following criteria are met: at least 15 publications (articles and studies) in specialized scientific editions, of which at least 2 publications in refereed foreign or international editions; participation in at least 2 research projects funded by an external source and availability of at least 5 scientific reports at national or international forums. Contributions are clearly and precisely formulated.

I have no joint publications with the candidate or any relationships that lead to conflicts of interest.

### **Oskar Becker: From Mathematics To Mantic Phenomenology**

An important cycle of his publications are those with a phenomenological and ontological focus, dealing with Edmund Husserl's constitutive phenomenology of transcendental consciousness, Martin Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology of Dasein, Oskar Becker's mantic phenomenology, and the complex relations among them. Crucial to the analysis of these complex relations is the context in which Hilbert's finitism is introduced in order to clarify how Becker uses it in such a way that he does not renounce the transfinite, according to Andreev's insightful analyses. This rests on metamathematics.<sup>1</sup>

In the “Philosophy of Arithmetic” (1891), the main role is played by the so-called “number-representations” (Zahl-Vorstellungen), which are unacceptable to Frege and his anti-psychologism in that, in the words of Jassen Andreev, they are “strongly suspicious.” On the other hand, Frege's number corresponds not to a single object, but to *the word for a concept*

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<sup>1</sup> “The best-known formalist view – by many persons considered the only form of formalism – is that of Hilbert. His basic idea was that the transfinite notions of mathematics were ideal constructions of the human mind. He admitted that there were certain “finitary” intuitive reasonings which had a priori absolute certainty; the transitive notions, which went beyond these, he considered mental creations bearing a relation to the finitary intuitive processes similar to that which imaginary numbers have to the reals. We can form such ideal creations freely, subject to one basic limitation, namely, that we be consistent. He proposed to establish this consistency for ordinary mathematics by examining the language in which this mathematics is expressed. His language was to be formulated so completely and so precisely stated rules – rules which were mechanical in the sense that the correctness of their application could be seen by inspection of the symbols themselves as concrete physical objects, without regard to any meaning which they might or might not have. These so formalized reasonings were to be the subject of a new mathematical investigation which he called metamathematics. In metamathematics he admitted only the finitary, absolutely certain methods of reasoning. His program was to establish the consistency of ordinary mathematics by this means. Its realization would then guarantee the absolute safety of mathematics for all time.” Curry, H. B. 1977. *Foundations of Mathematical Logic*. New York: Dover Publications, p. 11.

(der Begriffswort), under which the corresponding numbered objects fall. This leads to an important corollary in favor of Husserl: objects and concepts do not have the same objectivity, which is key to the subsequent grounding of number (itself emptied of content) in verifiable experience. How Heidegger pragmatically revises intentionality, profoundly analysed by Andreev, is also important here, but this will be discussed later. Moreover, with Husserl, even at this early stage of the influence of mathematics on phenomenology, there can be no question of a reification of the concept of set.

In a letter to Husserl dated May 24, 1891, Frege states that “objects and concepts have the same objectivity”, referring to his “Foundations of Arithmetic”, § 47<sup>2</sup>. In this paragraph, however, there is the equating of analytical truth and objectivity of a concept, because it claims that “when we mislead e.g. the concept of a body under the concept of heavy or the concept of a whale under the concept of a mammal, then we assert something objective.”<sup>3</sup> The synthetic real ground, insofar as it is laid down in the question *How is something given?*, turns out in such a case to be the ground of every analytic situation since, if we refer to Kant, the logically possible connection of concepts can only be thought after the latter have been understood through material contents. But the given, insofar as it is represented in the forms of possible knowledge, is withheld in them in a certain way, inasmuch as this withholding is determined not by the things but by the cognitive faculties belonging to the subject. It is clear that there are suspicious elements of at least implicit psychologism here, which, according to Jassen Andreev, must be reworked – Husserl does this as a next step in eidetic phenomenology. But, on the other hand, the question of how to interpret the number stripped of its content in the plan of metamathematical analyzes arises with full force.<sup>4</sup> Already at a later stage, in Oskar Becker's terminology, this situation is reducible to the fact that “Hilbert's formalism does not satisfy the phenomenological main principle of verifiability” (Ausweisbarkeit). The intentionality of consciousness in Husserl, defined in a similar aspect, is the basis for the word for a concept to have the concept itself as meaning and the object that falls under the concept as “meaning”. Because otherwise, as with Frege, the meaning of the concept would be reducible to the reification of the concept of set. And from this point, it is easy to think of a formalistic understanding of contentless signs without verification in living experience that can build a universal non-contradictory system and base all mathematics “for all time” on it, and logic accordingly. With Frege, as already said, the number does not correspond to an individual object, but to *the word for a concept* (Begriffswort), under which the numbered objects fall. A pragmatic reworking of intentionality, which is the subject of Andreev's analysis, opens up the question of how the reification of multiplicity and verifiable factuality are opposed in historically concrete existence in the mode of care (Sorge).

How does Heidegger recast intentionality? – this is a question that has been thoroughly examined by Jassen Andreev. I will introduce this question by analyzing a passage from “Being

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<sup>2</sup> Frege, G. 2000. “Frege to Husserl 24.5.1891” (bilingual edition). *KHORA* (Periodical of Contemporary Philosophy), I, 1: 40-45.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid: note vi, 44.

<sup>4</sup> “Hilbert had sought to rescue transfinite mathematics, however, by treating his formulas as uninterpreted, contentless combinations of signs whose formal consistency could be established by means of an interpreted finitary metamathematics.” (Sluga, H. 2019. “Oskar Becker or the Reconciliation of Mathematics and Existential Philosophy”, In: *Meta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy*, Vol. xi, No. 2 / December 2019: 569-588, ISSN 2067-3655, p. 573)

and Time” concerning fear. In §30 of “Being and Time” – “Fear [die Furcht] as a Mode of State-of-Mind” – Heidegger considers the detrimental (das Abträgliche) as “coming close” which “carries with it the patent possibility that it may stay away and pass us by”, but this “instead of lessening or extinguishing our fearing [das Fürchten], this enhances it [ausbildet]”; in the approach “increases this “it can, and yet, in the end, it may not” [“es kann und am Ende doch nicht”].”<sup>5</sup>

Svetlana Sabeva interprets the difference Furcht / Fürchten in the following way: “Furcht is the name of the phenomenon in its hermeneutic completeness, i.e. as a phenomenon of actual life; Fürchten is one of the phenomenological-hermeneutic modalities of meaning - the so-called Vollzugssinn (I translate it as “performative sense”; in Husserl it is the noetic), among the other two Bezugssinn and Gehaltssinn (in Husserl it is the noematic)” (quotation from personal correspondence). Kolyo Koev analyzes “the famous Heidegger’s pragmatic reworking of Husserl’s idea of intentionality, which from a cognitive category becomes a category of actual life, delineating its meaning of “relationship”, “content” and “realization” (Bezugssinn, Gehaltssinn, Volzugssinn) – three inextricably linked practical aspects of the life of intentionality”<sup>6</sup>. “In accordance with Husserl’s descriptive basic definitions, Heidegger divides intentionality into a triadic structure. Already very early, from 1919, he began to speak of a “fundamental phenomenological articulation” of intentionality. For its formulation, Heidegger still largely used the conceptual apparatus of Husserl’s classical-phenomenological paradigm. However, the main phenomenological concepts are included in the “theory of the phenomenological method itself”. Accordingly, all phenomenological concepts must be considered in the manner of their formation and understood primarily in their formal-indicative meanings. The problem of intentionality is dimensioned using formal-indicative terms through the triad: sense of reference, sense of content, and sense of performance. As Jassen Andreev notes in his text co-authored with Dimitri Ginev – “Die mathematische Existenz aus phänomenologischer Sicht” - this tripartite structure should give a complete descriptive-structural definition of intentionality.<sup>7</sup> Which is to say that the possibility of a danger passing away constructs the performative meaning of fear as das Fürchten in view of the “care” (Sorgen) that is “realized” in a world. Fear - das Fürchten - thus refers to the meaning of realization (Volzugssinn) in caring.

In order to avoid a systematically regulated temporality, Becker introduces “pure becoming” “through a series of reflections in which the totality of previous stages becomes the starting point for new reflections. These series are potentially infinite.” (Sluga 2019: 577). A little flashback. Becker, in “Dasein und Dawesen. Gesammelte philosophische Aufsätze” (1963) says the following: “Existential analysis is fully justified in its own domain, which cannot be circumscribed from outside. But at the same time, other powers exist which inseparably intertwine with existing Dasein. However, an “understanding” of these powers is impossible; they resist altogether the existential hermeneutic, phenomenological analysis.”<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Heidegger, M. 2001. *Being and Time*. Oxford: Blackwell, p. 180; Heidegger, M. 1967. *Sein und Zeit*. Elfte, unveränderte Auflage. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, p. 141.

<sup>6</sup> Koev, K. 2012. *Doomed to meaning. Everyday life as discursive possibilities*. Sofia: Obsidian, pp. 66-67. [in Bulgarian]

<sup>7</sup> Andreev, J., D. Ginev 2008. “Die Mathematische Existenz aus phänomenologischer Sicht”. in: Ginev, Dimitri (Hrsg.) *Aspekte der phänomenologischen Theorie der Wissenschaft*. Orbis Phaenomenologicus: Perspektiven, Neue Folge 21. Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, p. 145.

<sup>8</sup> Becker, O. 1963, *Dasein und Dawesen. Gesammelte philosophische Aufsätze*. Neske: Pfullingen, p. 92, cit. in: Sluga, H. 2019. “Oskar Becker or the Reconciliation of Mathematics and Existential Philosophy”, In: *Meta*:

It means that the above brief analysis of apprehension, in relation to an approaching menace, also shows the possibility of being a mental interweaving in the existing Dasein of an impinging as “another force”. The reworking of intentionality, which Jassen Andreev writes about in the cycle of texts dedicated to Becker, made by Heidegger and digestible at the level of mantic phenomenology, finds its well-founded introduction and development here. This is because in the mode of “care” (Sorge) the human being is rooted in a world, with which it is thus inextricably linked. This is how Becker's reception of Hilbert's finitism is affected: everything said above also affects the phenomenological main principle of verifiability (Ausweisbarkeit). In Becker's anthropological vision, which Jassen Andreev points out, mathematics remains to be “understood as a purely formal work with uninterpreted symbols”.<sup>9</sup> Here, in my opinion, is the place to mention “mathematical existence” too, which, according to Andreev for Becker, “is the one among all mathematical concepts that most clearly reveals where philosophical doubts and problems begin in mathematical science, apparently so surely grounded”.<sup>10</sup> Andreev's undoubted contribution is the disclosure of a “conceptual entanglement”: the acceptance of the intuitionist principle of the mathematical existence of effective constructability, but, on the other hand, in view of the phenomenological justification, the “legitimacy of the transfinite” also comes into force. The introduction of “transfinitely repeatable intentionality” again gives reason to think of the reworking of intentionality by Heidegger, which finds a place in Becker's formulations, in which reworking the finitist handling of contentless signs in a formally non-contradictory system becomes questionable. Furthermore, through the iteration of intentionality, the transfinite now operates at a second-order level and is invariably linked to reflexivity. Thus now, the transfinite concepts are no longer simply dubious creations of the human mind but build the existential structure tightly and are verified “in an act of initial perception”, insofar as they are no longer contentless signs but refer to a phenomenologically verifiable “possible original given”.

### Heidegger's Hermeneutic Phenomenology of Dasein

Another cycle of publications addresses an interpretation of Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology of Dasein, its central problem – die Seinsfrage – and its complex relationship with the Husserlian and Beckerian phenomenological project. The study “The practical subject as an objective goal. Towards an Existential Reading of Kant's Practical Philosophy” is also located in this cycle. In this study, Jassen Andreev examines the points of convergence of Kant's practical philosophy, in which *persona* and object are distinguished, and Heidegger's understanding of the self-reflexivity of the practical subject, which, inserted into an existential reading, has a way of being different from the way of being of the being-in-the-world. In this text, Andreev states the following: “Even if Kant distinguishes ontologically unambiguously *persona* and object as two basic types of being and fixes a “true difference” between subject and object, for him the being of “being-goal” (Zwecksein) and the being of the “being-thing” (Dingsein) seems to mean everywhere the same thing - objective *Being-present-at-hand*.”<sup>11</sup> However, this Heideggerian key to understanding neglects the distinction that Kant introduces between the phenomenal world endowed with intuition and the noumenal world beyond this

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<sup>9</sup> Sluga, H. Op. cit., p. 582

<sup>10</sup> Andreev, J. *Phenomenology and Mathematics under Oskar Becker*, in print. [in Bulgarian]

<sup>11</sup> Andreev, J. 2015. “The practical subject as an objective goal. Towards an existential reading of Kant's practical philosophy”. in: *Philosophia. Journal of Philosophy and Culture*, vol. IX: 13-31. [in Bulgarian]

intuition. In the “Critique of Pure Reason”, Kant says: “Thus happiness in exact proportion with the morality of rational beings, through which they are worthy of it, alone constitutes the highest good of a world into which we must without exception transpose ourselves in accordance with the precepts of pure but practical reason, and which, of course, is only an intelligible world, since the sensible world does not promise us that sort of systematic unity of ends, the reality of which can be grounded on nothing other than the presupposition of a highest original good, since self-sufficient reason, armed with all of the sufficiency of a supreme cause, in accordance with the most perfect purposiveness, grounds, conserves, and completes the order of things that is universal though well hidden from us in the sensible world.”<sup>12</sup>

A question to Andreev: *Doesn't the self-regarding of independent reason formally indicate another way of being and thereby set a different perspective for commensurating with Heidegger's self-regarding Dasein as a different way of being in relation to the things available in the world?* My proposal is to use the formal indication and, through it, to analyse Kant's statements on the question of modality. Practical action is *in* the world, but it is not *of* the world; it is in the mode of *as it were* in relation to a world in which the conditions of sensibility are absent. A world that can only be indicated formally if we want to play on Heidegger's field.

Above, in relation to Oskar Becker's phenomenological formulations, it was pointed out that through the iteration of intentionality, the transfinite already operates at a second-order level and is invariably linked to reflexivity. The latter implies the self-relation of Dasein in relation to a pragmatic reworking of the Kantian acting subject. Or, according to the study “Toward a Concept of the “in Order to”-Contexts Handling in *Being and Time*”, and in implicit relation to the thesis that treating oneself as an ultimate goal of Dasein introduces self-reflection into existential analysis (human being as an end in itself): “For the sake of” (Umwillen) is the concept used by Heidegger to denote Dasein as the ultimate end, as that for which every practical activity takes place, as well as to denote of Dasein (in direct parallel to Kant's definition of man) as an end in itself (Dasein als Umwillen seiner selbst).”<sup>13</sup> Andreev, highlighting these connections, skilfully refers from one cycle to another, with which the thus provided for review corpus of texts takes shape.

## **Hermeneutic Humanities**

Another corpus of texts offers “an attempt at a historical hermeneutics of historical-philological knowledge”. In it, a historical-cultural overview of interpretive humanities is made, the orientation towards highlighting the mutual correlation between two types of organization of humanitarian-scientific activity in a project for a general historical hermeneutics of the historical-philological part of cultural studies is also presented, the transition from the traditionalism of “canon” to “innovation” produced as a result of “methodologisation”, “professionalisation”, “positivisation”, and “scientific studification” in the cultural sciences (Kulturwissenschaften) and the sciences of mind (Geisteswissenschaften). The imperatives of *Research* and *Forschungsprozess* leading to “innovation” refer to the scientific rationality of a modern concept in cultural studies, which Andreev considers against the background of a pre-

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<sup>12</sup> Kant, I. 1998. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Translated in English and edited by Paul Geyer and Allen Woods. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 681-682 (A814/B842)

<sup>13</sup> Andreev, J. 2011. “Toward a Concept of the “in Order to”-Contexts Handling in *Being and Time*”. In: Angelov, G., A. Dimitrov, G. Donev, V. Kanawrow (eds.), *The Abyss Heidegger*. Blagoevgrad: University Publishing House “Neofit Rilski”, p. 142. [In Bulgarian]

modern orientation that is “erudite, static, traditionalist, and archival”.<sup>14</sup> Analyses include Friedrich Wolff's “textual criticism”, August Böck's “formal” and “methodical” cultural approach, Leopold von Ranke's “aesthetic-contemplative historicism”, and Johann Droysen's “investigative understanding” of history. Andreev's indisputable contribution is the detailed explanation of the thesis that “historicist historical science finds itself deeply indebted to the long and rich tradition of *die klassische Philologie*, namely: indebted above all and first of all to the elementary core of its practical scientific enterprise – historical – the philological method”.<sup>15</sup>

## Conclusion

I find the theoretical achievements of the candidate sufficiently high; I congratulate him for the multifaceted erudition demonstrated in the historical-scientific connections between metamathematics and phenomenology, hermeneutic ontology and transcendental philosophy, hermeneutic humanitarianism and classical philology. As a recommendation, I would point out that these connections could be deepened even more and, as a result, an original monographic study with even more clearly distinguished original theses would be obtained. On the basis of the above-mentioned notes, comments and recommendations, I propose to the respected Scientific Council of IPS-BAS to elect Jassen Andreev for the academic position of “Associate professor” for the needs of “Ontology and Epistemology” section, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at the BAS, Professional direction 2.3 Philosophy (Ontology).

Sofia,

27.11.2023

Kristiyan Enchev

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<sup>14</sup> Andreev, J. 2022. “The Cultural Knowledge Model: From Tradition and Erudition to Research Method”. In: Vaseva-Dikova, J. (ed.), *World and knowledge* (Collection on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of Angel Stefanov). Sofia: University Publishing House “St. Kliment Ohridski”, pp. 38-53, cit. p. 40.

<sup>15</sup> Andreev, J. 2023. “Hermeneutic Humanities and Procedural Rationality”. In: Gicheva-Gocheva, D., S. Krasteva, P. Goranov (ed.), *ARUKO-readings*. Sofia: University Publishing House “St. Kliment Ohridski”, pp. 456-482, cit. p. 456.